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Of Standards for Extra-Judicial Behavior 
Russell R Wheeler* 
THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLIT-
ICAL ACTIVITIES OF Two SUPREME COURT JUSTICES. By Bruce Al-
len Murphy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. x, 473. 
$18.95. 
I 
Bruce Allen Murphy delved into reams of manuscripts and other 
sources to learn more of the policy objectives of Louis Brandeis and Felix 
Frankfurter and the extrajudicial means they used to achieve those objec-
tives. This work led to three very good law review articles, 1 which received 
much less notice than they deserved. The same research effort then led to 
The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection: The Secret Political Activities of Two 
Supreme Court Justices, which produced a spate of excited public commen-
tary on what the book purported to reveal and not a little criticism of Mur-
phy's methods and results.2 
The book describes both jurists' backgrounds and the relationship be-
tween Justice Brandeis and Professor Frankfurter that helped Brandeis 
serve his commitments to Wilsonian Progressivism and to Zionism while on 
the Court. Murphy then recounts Justice Frankfurter's contacts with per-
sons here and abroad in pursuit of various foreign and domestic policy 
goals, and then his efforts to influence appointments to the federal bench. 
In an appendix, Murphy attempts a chronological review of fluctuations in 
• B.A. 1965, Augustana College (Illinois); M.A. 1968, Ph.D. 1970, University of Chicago; 
Deputy Director, Division of Continuing Education and Training, Federal Judicial Center. 
(The analyses and points of view in this essay should not be taken as in any way the views or 
policies of the Federal Judicial Center.) - Ed. 
I am grateful to Ronald Collins for assistance as I began the preparation of this essay, to 
Gordon Bermant, A. Leo Levin, Helen Moriarty and Howard Whitcomb for a careful reading 
of a preliminary version and for helpful suggestions and comments, and to Carolyn McGinnis 
for deciphering the puzzles in successive revised drafts. 
I. See Levy & Murphy, Preserving the Progressive Spirit in a Conservative Time: The Joint 
Reform .Ffforts ef Justice Brandeis and Prefessor Frankfurter, 1916-1933, 78 MICH. L. REV. 
1252 (1980) (examining Frankfurter's pre-New Deal collaboration with Brandeis to promote 
their political views); Murphy, Elements ef Extrajudicial Strategy: A Look at the Political Roles 
ef Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter, 69 GEO. L.J. 101 (1980) (discussing the tactics that Bran-
deis and Frankfurter used on the Court to influence nonjudicial public policy); Murphy, A 
Supreme Court Justice as Politician: Felix Frankfurter and Federal Court Appointments, 21 AM. 
J. LEGAL HlsT. 317 (1977) (recounting Frankfurter's efforts to influence appointments to the 
federal bench). 
2. See Cover, Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1982. at 17; Frank, Book Review, 32 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 432 (1982); Kurland, Book Review, LEGAL TIMES WASH., Apr. 12, 1982, at 
10; Schlesinger, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1982, § 7, at 5, col. l; Steinberg, Book 
Review, 68 A.B.A. J. 716 (1982); Woodward, Book Review, Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 1982 (Book 
World). 
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standards of extrajudicial behavior prior to 1916, when Brandeis joined the 
Court (pp. 345-63). 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., credits The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection 
with two contributions. First, he says it "makes us think hard about stan-
dards of judicial behavior."3 In addition, Schlesinger asserts that the book 
"makes us think realistically about the Court itself."4 Perhaps Schlesinger's 
assessment is too generous. If the book really does make us think hard 
about judicial behavior, the hard thinking does not follow from any search-
ing inquiry that Murphy makes. Murphy looks at those standards (pp. 6-7, 
247-75, 341-44), but not in great depth. Rather the thinking the book 
prompts about the Court and judicial behavior stems mainly from the mass 
of factual material Murphy provides. 
A 
The book's source of strength - its detailed description of events -
also gives rise to major weaknesses: flimsy inferences and occasional fac-
tual errors. Professor Robert Cover of Yale Law School, for example, finds 
a pattern of inaccuracies and, more than that, he claims that "even those 
important assertions that restate evidence are the product of a selective 
method which ignores all but the most damning, conspiratorial interpreta-
tions."5 Schlesinger sees the same problem, albeit with a different twist. To 
him, the book is "disfigured by a host of minor errors" and Murphy "gives 
Brandeis and Frankfurter too much credit for decisions that were favored 
by other people and compelled by events."6 
In one sense, such criticisms are not surprising, because Murphy's pre-
sentation largely lacks any overarching theme save that both Brandeis and 
Frankfurter labored off the bench to promote causes important to them. 
Yet the book is worth reading, not because of any overall picture it 
presents, but because of its fascinating extra judicial short stories, describing 
incident after incident played out between the Harvard Law School, the 
United States Supreme Court, the White House, the Congress, and assorted 
other places. Such a book stimulates a natural tendency to probe for inac-
curacies and for questionable interpretations. 
It is not unduly charitable to say that Murphy's interpretations often are 
plausible. The problem is that he presents them as conclusive when his 
facts merely create an arguable case for them. A conspicuous instance of the 
line between the conclusive assertion and the arguable interpretation may 
be the aspect of the book that has achieved the most notoriety. Stated 
baldly, Harvard Law Professor Felix Frankfurter was on a retainer to 
United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis. Although Murphy 
cautions that "the Harvard professor cannot be viewed solely as Brandeis' 
agent" (p. 43), Frankfurter was, for all intents, Brandeis' "paid political lob-
byist and lieutenant" (p. 10), "the scribe" (p. 153), "the right lieutenant" (p. 
33) to do work that Brandeis, for reasons of propriety or appearance, could 
3. Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 22. 
4. Id at 23. 
5. Cover, supra note 2, at 19. 
6. Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 5, 22. 
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not undertake himself. To help Frankfurter meet the expenses of fighting 
bureaucratic battles and educ~ting the public, Brandeis, starting in 1916, 
provided him with monetary gifts. Later, from 1926 to 1938 - the year 
Frankfurter joined the Court - Brandeis gave Frankfurter an annual sti-
pend of $3,500 (pp. 40-42).7 
As Murphy concedes in an endnote, other researchers already had dis-
closed the existence of the payments (p. 373 n.80). Several of Frankfurter's 
students, in fact, knew of the disbursements, which often funded research 
projects aimed at furthering Brandeis/Frankfurter goals.8 Nor is it news, as 
Murphy recognizes, that Brandeis and Frankfurter worked closely on the 
national political scene. Tugwell, for instance, referred to the team in 1934 
(pp. 176, 416 n.96), and in 1946 Mason described Frankfurter as "tutor to 
the new administration [who] ... in tum, sought light and guidance on 
general policy as well as on specific programs from Justice Brandeis."9 
Despite these previous revelations, Murphy has, no doubt, contributed 
an important piece to this historical mosaic. An endnote typical of much of 
the book tells how: "This is the first exposition in print of the development 
and complete extent of both the financial fund and the requests that 
stemmed from it" (p. 373 n.80). 
But how singular was this instance of Brandeis' extrajudicial behavior? 
Murphy relies on Mason's table listing the extensive gifts that the justice 
provided between 1890 and 1939 to numerous individuals and charitable 
causes (pp. 41, 373 n.82). The list shows, for example, that Brandeis gave 
relatives and friends over $27,000 in 1925; $177,000 in 1929; and $71,000 in 
1930 - all told over half a million dollars, about a third of the nearly $1.5 
million in gifts accounted for by Mason for the entire 49 years. 10 
The considerable extent of these gifts leads one to wonder whether 
Frankfurter, albeit Brandeis' "chief political lieutenant" (p. 170), was the 
only "lieutenant." Murphy describes Mason's list of gifts as "complete" (p. 
373 n.82) even though by Murphy's own account it apparently is not. 11 
7. Although Frankfurter viewed "himself as an employee being compensated for services 
rendered," p. 41, we are not told whether he regarded the payments as taxable income or 
whether the Justice Department or Senate Judiciary Committee learned of the payments at the 
time of his nomination to the Court. 
8. Murphy concludes, ''.judging by the lack of knowledge evident in a personal [telephone] 
interview with one of these students ha!f a century later, . • many of Frankfurter's proteges will 
learn here for the first time about the true chain of inspiration to which they were responding." 
P. 86 (emphasis added). The "student" was Henry Friendly. P. 386 n.49. Another student, 
though - in Frankfurter's Federal Jurisdiction seminar in 1929-30 - recalled that Frank-
furter "told me of the work he was doing for Justice Brandeis and the moneys he received, and 
the other students in the seminar also knew of these payments." Lewis H. Weinstein, Letter to 
the Editor, HARV. L. REC., Apr. 16, 1982, at 11. The exchange proves nothing save the need 
for caution in making declarative statements. 
9. A. MAsoN, BRANDEIS: FREE MAN'S LIFE 615 (1946). 
10. Id. at 692. 
II. It is doubtful that the total of almost $1.5 million includes the money that Brandeis 
gave to Frankfurter, because Murphy's documentation of these gifts is evidently derived from 
correspondence to which Mason did not have access. In a star note, p. 101, Murphy explains 
how Mason was deprived of access to Brandeis-Frankfurter correspondence "during the thir-
ties," but earlier he characterizes things more broadly: Mason wrote "without benefit of access 
to the very revealing correspondence Brandeis maintained with ... Frankfurter while Frank-
furter was a professor at Harvard." P. 8. In any event, Mason obviously did not write about 
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Was Frankfurter the only colleague who worked in response to Brandeis' 
requests and who, in turn, benefited from this considerable largesse, for 
himself or to support still other collaborators (pp. 84, 86)? Brandeis made 
"extensive use of intermediaries" (p. 73); Murphy constantly uses "lieuten-
ant" to describe people who worked with both Brandeis and Frankfurter. 
He so describes, for but one example, Brandeis' allies in the leadership of 
the Zionist Organization of America (pp., e.g., 31, 55-56, 65-66), an organi-
zation that received Brandeis' .financial support (pp. 68, 38 I n.104). It 
would in no way discount the uniqueness (pp. 39, 400) of the "Bran-
deis/Frankfurter connection" to learn that others received some of Bran-
deis' .financial support with the understanding that they would pursue his 
objectives. It might, though, temper Murphy's description of the relation-
ship as "extraordinary" (p. 43) or as "so unusual . . . [in] that it was 
designed to free Brandeis from the shackles of remaining nonpolitical while 
on the bench ... " (p. 41). Answering the question might require manu-
script searching even more prodigious than that Murphy undertook. As he 
implies in describing how he came across one source, even more material 
may await discovery (p. 218 n.*). 
B 
Murphy's inability to tell the story free of the unqualified inference co-
incides with his inability to tell the story free of the historiographical boast. 
Boosterism pervades the book, much more than the articles. 12 Thus, refer-
ences are rarely to correspondence but rather to such self-promotions as a 
"newly discovered missive," "which remained hidden in Moley's unpub-
lished papers" (p. 172) or "[n]ew evidence gleaned from various collections 
of unpublished letters [that] makes it possible for the first time in print to 
reconstruct the justice's efforts here" (p. 330). Throughout, Murphy re-
minds us that his information came from "a personal interview" (e.g. , p. 
297) or "a confidential interview" (e.g. , p. 312) or "an interview for this 
volume" (p. 132). In reporting Brandeis' influence on Frankfurter's un-
signed New Republic articles, Murphy specifies that "until now no volume 
has revealed the extent to which the true inspiration for many of these 
pieces was . . . Brandeis" (p. 89). Perhaps Murphy feared that if he did not 
broadcast the diligence of his efforts, scholars would not recognize what he 
had discovered, and all readers would not be impressed with his hard work. 
The publisher may bear some fault for this belabored tone of secrets 
discovered.13 Oxford should have redirected at least some of its resources 
into the extra costs necessary to carry all notes at page bottom rather than 
book's end - and in editing them. Reliable documentation is everything to 
a book such as this, and the reader must have confidence that the notes 
have been carefully reviewed. Yet, one note cites twenty pages of an Alan 
Westin article to support the text's assertion that Brandeis, "contrary to the 
prevailing understanding . . . engaged an extensive literary network, 
the payments to Frankfurter, although it is possible that the sources he used to construct the 
list of Brandeis's gifts included those to Frankfurter, but masked or aggregated with others. 
12. See note 1 supra. 
13. See, e.g., the suggestions in Kurland, supra note 2, at IO; Cover, supra note 2, at 21. 
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anchored by Frankfurter, to disseminate his opinions . ." (pp. 88-89, 387 
n.60). Presumably Murphy meant to cite Westin's assertion that after 1916, 
"Brandeis said nothing in public about Court matters," 14 and then summa-
rize his own reinterpretation. If that is what he meant to do, why does the 
book not do it that way? The language of another note is repeated almost 
word for word in the text where it is flagged (p. 105, 392 n.21). Another 
note citing literature "on the disparity between Frankfurter's religion and 
his desire for social status" (p. 425, n.56) is flagged at a passage in the text 
that bears on that point in, at best, a highly tenuous fashion (p. 207). Since 
Murphy treats the point at issue much earlier in the text (p. 34), the note's 
placement may have been a remnant of a previous draft. The index is also 
in occasional error: University of Virginia Law Professor G. Edward 
White, for example, is not the Louisiana-born Chief Justice (pp. 20, 473). 
C 
All this said - even if Murphy's description of the events is flawed 
factually or interpretively - he has added to our knowledge in two ways. 
First, he provides a documentation of numerous activities, and he fills in so 
many details as to provide a new picture of the lives of these two extraordi-
nary individuals. Cover asserts that Schlesinger documented long ago that 
Brandeis was "perhaps the dominant influence in the 'Second New 
Deal.' " 15 But Schlesinger himself credits Murphy with performing "a first-
class job of research," and of "reconstruct[ing] episodes in the inner history 
of the Supreme Court, of the New Deal and of World War II (Washington 
sector), in new detail. ... " 16 Second, and this says something about the 
nature of scholarly inquiry, Murphy has provided a framework within 
which others can work. Understanding develops by interpretation and rein-
terpretation. An initial interpretation, even with flaws, is often the necessary 
impetus for further analysis that adds even more to our knowledge. 
II 
What Murphy does not provide, however, is any thorough analysis of 
the standards that should govern extrajudicial behavior. His work is full of 
shrug-of-the-shoulder references to the separation-of-powers doctrine, with 
the erroneous implication that the doctrine must apply to all the varieties of 
extrajudicial behavior revealed in the book (see pp. 5, 22, and especially p. 
15). In an appendix, furthermore, he attempts an analysis of how norms of 
extrajudicial behavior have evolved. Nevertheless, on the strength of this 
book alone, one's thinking about what is proper and improper for justices to 
do extrajudicially is hardly advanced. It may well be that such advance-
ment was not Murphy's primary goal (pp. 13-15). 
I would like to pose several questions about extrajudicial behavior, 
mostly by Supreme Court justices, and use some of the book's rich data to 
explore how they might be answered. 
14. Westin, Out of Court Commentary by United States Supreme Court Justices, 1790-1962: 
Of Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw, 62 CoLUM. L. REV. 633, 635 (1962). 
15. Cover, supra note 2, at 18. 
16. Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 5, 22. 
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One might first ask why justices should engage in extrajudicial activities. 
This phrasing is at odds with the common formulation: Why should they 
avoid them? To many, the latter question is answered sufficiently by a few 
descriptions of what judges have done off the bench - each followed by an 
exclamation point. A little reflection, however, will suggest benefits from 
several kinds of extrajudicial behavior, benefits that I summarize here and 
then discuss in more detail. First, the role of judges in political society may 
give them unique attributes to bring to other aspects of public policy. At a 
different level, they bring the special knowledge and perspective of those 
who have "been there" to debates over how our judicial institutions should 
be administered and who should be judges. In addition, judges have likely 
developed perspectives and some degree of political acumen before their 
appointments that could be put to extrajudicial service. And, by a similar 
token, an occasional extrajudicial role might maintain the breadth of a 
judge's perspectives and inform the judicial mind. 
To many, these statements do nothing but illuminate the threats that 
extrajudicial activity poses to the judicial function. That activity may, for 
example, deprive judges of the time and energy they need to decide cases 
fairly and explain their decisions clearly. Extrajudicial contact with a mat-
ter may inhibit the impartial consideration of that matter in the context of 
litigation. Similarly, the desire to stay in the graces of, for example, a Presi-
dent who might bestow the favor of an extrajudicial activity might prevent 
their considering other matters impartially. Finally, regardless of whether 
an extrajudicial activity affects justices' behavior, it may create doubt - an 
ambiguity - in the minds of those who must have confidence that judges 
will be fair, those without whose confidence the judicial fiat stands in dan-
ger of disrespect. 
How do the results of Murphy's prodigious research help illuminate 
these purported benefits and costs? 
III 
Adjudication, especially constitutional adjudication, requires judges to 
participate in political society in a special way, applying fundamental 
norms to resolve controversial fact situations. This experience, building on 
judges' pre-judicial experiences, arguably creates a unique political per-
spective and even political skills that might well be of value to the resolu-
tion of matters outside case-or-controversy fora. This view was held much 
more widely in the founding period than it is now. Many then agreed with 
George Mason, who told the constitutional convention that the judges' 
"habit and practice of considering laws in their true principles, and in all 
their consequences," laid a strong case that "further use be made of the 
Judges, of giving aid in preventing every improper law."17 In fact, John 
Jay's major contribution as Chief Justice was to show the dangers of too 
heavy a reliance on "further use" of judges as commission members and 
presidential advisers.18 
17. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 78 (rev. ed. 
1937). The convention of course rejected the specific objective that Mason was advocating, 
viz., a Council of Revision, with judicial membership. 
18. Wheeler, Extrajudicia/ Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV, 123. 
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The basic notion of judges' obligation to render extra judicial service has 
persisted, however, and it may help explain - Murphy makes clear it 
would hardly explain fully (pp. 304-08ff.) - why Frankfurter defended 
Jackson's service as special prosecutor at Nuremberg. Frankfurter, despite 
his public stance that Justices should not "tak[e] on other jobs," assured 
Jackson, not only of "the profound importance" of his mission, but that he 
"would discharge the task according to the finest professional standards 
both intellectually and ethically" (p. 306). One of Jackson's colleagues at 
Nuremberg states the position in a more blunt, if self-serving, fashion: 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge John Parker proclaimed that Jack-
son's mission was justified because there are occasionally calls "for a judge 
to do something for his country which no one but a judge can do so well." 19 
Murphy, in fact, notes that Frankfurter succeeded in his extrajudicial tasks 
in part because, as a Justice, he was a "free agent. . . . While nearly every-
one in Washington could be suspect of jockeying for a position and status, 
special attention would be paid to that 'impartial observer, Felix,' who had 
already reached the pinnacle of his career ambitions" (p. 189). 
Obviously the degree to which judges can contribute extrajudicially as 
judges will vary with the task at hand and with the judge performing it. A 
desire to grace an important mission with an ornament of impartiality is not 
enough to justify involving judges in the task. For example, having justices 
serve on the commission to resolve the disputed presidential election of 
1876 appears, in retrospect, to have been a poor idea. Given the venality of 
the age, and the Court's still-incomplete recuperation from the .Dred Scott 
wound, it was unlikely that the justices' service could have helped resolve 
challenged election results at the end of the Reconstruction Era. The prob-
lem is captured in a Southern newspaper's editorial hope that "if Justice 
Bradley could withstand the party pressure that reached him [to sustain 
Reconstruction legislation on the bench], there does not appear to be any 
reasonable grounds for supposing that he will succumb to such pressure" on 
the commission.20 I have serious doubts, for a contemporary example, that 
the Supreme Court Justices should be directed to set congressional salaries, 
despite the assertions by two members of the Senate leadership in 1982 that 
a constitutional amendment to that end would be "the wisest and most 
apolitical delegation of such compensation setting authority .... " 21 
Few, however, would contest the basic assumption behind Canon 4 of 
the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct. The canon per-
mits judges to write and lecture on the administration of justice, to appear 
before or consult with governmental bodies or officials on matters concern-
ing the administration of justice, and to serve as members or directors of 
judicial improvement organizations. In these matters, asserts the commen-
tary, a judge "is in a unique position to contribute," and it encourages 
judges to do so as the~ time permits.22 Procedural rule-making benefits 
19. Parker, The Judicial Office in the United States, 23 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225, 237 (1948). 
20. C. WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION 154 (1951) (quoting the Louisville Courrier-
Joumal, Jan. 22, 1877). 
21. See proposed S.J. Res. 164, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S. 2022 (Mar. 11, 
1982), and statements by Senators Stevens and Baker, id at 2022-23. 
22. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, & commentary, at 18-19 (1972). 
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from their involvement.23 Their advice on jurisdictional matters, for which 
Alexander Bickel claimed they are "uniquely expert,"24 is similarly benefi-
cial. And much of the work that Brandeis and Frankfurter, along with col-
leagues and students, did during the 1920s involved the development of 
arguments for changes in federal jurisdiction, including the research that 
was eventually published as The Business of the Supreme Court25 (pp. 84ff.). 
Even though judges are hardly infallible in shaping judicial administration 
policies, and although they certainly do not reflect all the perspectives that 
need to be brought to bear on the process, surely they should be heard. 
Turning to a slightly different category, Murphy devotes most of a chap-
ter to Frankfurter's efforts to promote the judicial candidacies of certain 
individuals he thought particularly well qualified for the federal bench and 
to derail those of others (pp. 313-38; Brandeis also attempted to influence 
appointments, pp. 48-49). Frankfurter had developed a particular view of 
criteria that should - and that should not - govern judicial selection (pp. 
316-17); it would be surprising to find a judge who has not. Judges know, 
in a way that others cannot, what the judicial office entails, what qualities it 
needs most, and what kinds of individuals would be appropriate for it. 
"Merit selection" commissions for state judicial nominations often include 
judges as members. In Missouri, where the system has been most rigor-
ously probed, Watson and Downing report that of the commissioners, "the 
judges . . . have evidenced the greatest variety of perspectives on judicial 
selection."26 They bring the lawyer's knowledge to the task, but without 
attendant bar rivalries, and they surely have a special insight into what the 
job of judging entails. As with judicial administration innovations, sitting 
judges' perspectives on judicial selection are limited and hardly apolitical, 
and there are risks, described below, to their involvement. But there are 
benefits as well. 
Judicial-related attributes aside, individuals who manage to get ap-
pointed to the bench, especially the highest bench in the land, presumably 
bring to their chambers more than legal experience and perspective. Al-
most by definition, they have been actively involved in the affairs of the 
day. Forbidding all extrajudicial service would, by definition, deprive the 
nation of the benefits of those personal attributes. 
Forbidding extrajudicial activity is, in a sense, at odds with the demo-
cratic notion that political society benefits from the participation of its 
23. See the discussion, and the literature cited therein, in W. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAK-
ING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES (Federal Judicial Center 1981). 
24. Nonjudicial Activities of Supreme Court Justices and Other Federal Judges: Hearings on 
S. 1097 and S. 2109 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 91st Cong., Isl Sess. 138 (1969) (statement of Alexander Bickel, Chancellor Kent 
Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale University) [hereinafter cited as Nonjudicial Activi• 
ties Hearings]. 
25. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928). 
26. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR 337-38 
(1969). The United States Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities 
has accepted "the premise that, as [federal] judicial selection processes become more institu-
tionalized and with wider participation, judges have a responsibility [when asked specifically 
or by a general call for information] to communicate their recommendations and evaluations 
to the appointive authorities - the President and Senators - and their selection committees 
or commissions." Advisory Opinion No. 59, Apr. 16, 1979. 
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members. Justice Douglas once expressed something of this view. In 1939, 
the Supreme Court decided O'Malley v. Woodrough, 27 upholding the con-
stitutionality oflegislation subjecting federal judges to the income tax. "As 
I entered my vote in the docket book," Douglas claimed, "I decided that I 
had just voted myself first-class citizenship. . . . Since I would be paying 
as heavy an income tax as my neighbor, I decided to participate in local, 
state, and national affairs, except and unless a particular issue was likely to 
get into the Court, and unless the activity was plainly political or parti-
san."28 Douglas's assertion of cause and effect is somewhat disingenuous: 
even without O'Malley, one suspects, he would have decided to "register 
and vote; ... fight to raise the level of the [Yakima] public schools [and] 
become immersed in conservation, opposing river pollution, advocating 
wildlife protection, and the like ... [and] travel and speak out on foreign 
affairs."29 
Murphy makes a relatively compelling case that Brandeis' forceful ef-
forts helped to move the New Deal away from the corporate-state mentality 
that it exhibited in its early years (pp. 185, 343 & passim). He documents 
that Frankfurter, while on the Court, played an important role in the estab-
lishment of various foreign policy efforts of the Roosevelt Administration 
that broke the isolationist hold dominant in the late 1930s and the early 
1940s (pp. 227,282,302 &passim). 
To say that we have no assurance that justices' activities off the bench 
will produce "contributions" is to miss the point entirely. We would not 
think of requiring such assurances before sanctioning the political activities 
of any nonjudge. Brandeis' role in turning the direction of the New Deal, 
or Frankfurter's in affecting American foreign policy, would not have unan-
imously been labelled "contributions" at the time, nor would they today. 
The test of the propriety of their action is not the degree of approval on the 
merits, but the costs, if any, to the Court - and to the system of justice 
generally - of Supreme Court justices' acting extrajudicially. 
Finally, it may be that extrajudicial activity can also work to the advan-
tage of the judicial process itself. Justice Douglas offered a stronger reason 
for exercising his "first-class citizenship" than his status as a taxpayer, a 
reason captured in his rather cavalier assertion that a "man or woman who 
becomes a Justice should try to stay alive; a lifetime diet of the law alone 
turns most judges into dull, dry husks."30 
Justice Rehnquist treated a tangential aspect of this question in explain-
ing his refusal to disqualify himself from the Court's reconsideration of 
Laird v. Tatum 31 because of his involvement as an executive department 
official in matters before the court. Apart from his specific involvement 
with the matter was the contention, as he summarized it, ''that I should 
disqualify myself because I have previously expressed in public an under-
standing of the law and the question of the constitutionality ofgovernmen-
27. 307 U.S. 277 (1939). 
28. W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 466 (1974). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 469. 
31. 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.). 
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tal surveillance." Rehnquist's response serves as a reminder that justices of 
the Supreme Court are drawn from the legal political community in part 
because they are among its more prominent members. He noted numerous 
justices who, before they went on the bench, played roles in matters that 
presented themselves to the Court in the case-or-controversy context, and 
reasoned that it 
would be not merely unusual, but extraordinary, if they had not at least 
given opinions as to constitutional issues in their previous legal careers. 
Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete 
tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of 
lack of qualification, not lack of bias.32 
The question remains whether certain kinds of extra judicial activities might 
similarly enhance a justice's work on the Court. Judging in a democracy is 
a vital process, and the nation has some interest in knowing that its judges 
are not permanently cut off from the juices that flow through society. 
Moreover, it may be that justices see the opportunity for such involvement 
as an advantage. The reaction of one of Brandeis' law clerks, J. Willard 
Hurst, to Murphy's book is instructive: "The Supreme Court deals with 
matters of important public policy," and thus, he said, "[y]ou want people 
sophisticated in the affairs of the country, not the naive or simple-minded. 
• • ."
33 To seek extrajudicial outlets may be a natural inclination of the 
kind of people appointed to the Court. The Brandeis/ Frankfurter Connec-
tion certainly leaves the suspicion that both justices may have seriously re-
considered joining the Court if all extrajudicial involvement could, 
somehow, have been proscribed: They would have been different persons, 
at least, frustrated by the proscription. Would the nation have benefited 
from either of those possibilities? This is, to me, the kind of realistic think-
ing that Schlesinger says the book promotes34 and that serves us well even if 
it puzzles us. The puzzlement is captured in Murphy's simple conclusion 
that both men "found it impossible to curb their political zeal after their 
appointments to the bench" (p. 9). Is it realism or irresponsibility to accept 
that inability in some justices? "Perhaps it is time," Murphy suggests, "that 
we question more realistically what we can and cannot expect from those 
who sit on our highest Court" (p. 8). 
IV 
In O'Malley, the case that Justice Douglas claimed liberated him for a 
life beyond the purple curtain, Justice Frankfurter wrote that judges' "par-
ticular function in government does not generate an immunity from sharing 
with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose 
Constitution and laws they are charged with administering."35 Judges do 
have a "particular function in government," which takes precedence over 
any other function. The benefits that extrajudicial activities may bring to 
32. 409 U.S. at 835. 
33. Margolick, 2 Justices' Friends Back Secret Role, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1982, § I, at 27, 
col. I. 
34. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. 
35. O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277,282 (1939). 
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American political life must be weighed against the burdens those activities 
may impose on that "particular function." 
Weighing those burdens, to be sure, requires a profound judgment. It 
also requires, much more than commentators have been willing to acknowl-
edge, answers to basically empirical questions, ie., questions of fact that 
can, in principle at least, be proved wrong. We are short on facts and long 
on suspicions about the consequences of extrajudicial activities. 
The facts needed to inform our judgment are of various types. Some 
can come only from the judges and those who work directly with them. For 
example, what is the impact of extrajudicial activity on judges' time de-
mands and work habits? Although there have been some efforts to measure 
how judges spend their time, there has been no focus on extrajudicial activi-
ties' impact on their judicial work and such a focus would surely be seri-
ously blurred.36 Our sense of the costs that discrete extrajudicial activities 
may extract is likely to derive largely from specific examples. Chief Justice 
Warren, for instance, insisted that he would not give up his judicial duties 
during the investigation of the Kennedy assassination. After he left office, 
he told a television interviewer that he "would run back and forth between 
[the Court and the commission offices across the street]. I don't believe I 
left my work before midnight any night for ten months."37 What the im-
pact of the extra burden was on his Supreme Court activities one can only 
surmise. 
Murphy provides a more revealing example. Although Brandeis' extra-
judicial work evidently had no effect on his Court workload (pp. 53, 54), 
Frankfurter's did. During Frankfurter's pre- and early-World War II in-
volvement in all manner of foreign policy matters, his rate of opinion pro-
duction did not decline. Murphy, however, concludes from interviews with 
Frankfurter clerks that he delegated a larger share of his judicial work to 
his law clerks during the period from 1941 to 1943 than he did before or 
after it. Save for those years, Frankfurter himself prepared the initial drafts 
of his judicial opinions. From 1941 to 1943, however, his law clerk did so 
in every case but one (pp. 273-75). Although any difference in the final 
product has evidently eluded observers of the Court, the shift in work pat-
terns was arguably an abdication of judicial responsibility to pursue ~xtra-
36. I am aware of only one serious effort, to calculate how justices allocate their time. See 
Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959). It involved, by 
the author's admission, "guesswork in part," id at 84, and, more than that, estimates expressed 
in averages, which say little about the capacity of nonfungible justices to allocate their time. In 
any event, Hart's concern was not the amount of time drained away by extrajudicial activities. 
An analysis in 1972 of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit revealed that 
40 percent of the judges' time was devoted to matters unrelated to cases - mainly court ad-
ministration activity. The study could not say - it would have been imprudent to ask - what 
amount of time went to the full range of extrajudicial activities. See Federal Judicial Center,A 
Summary of the Third Circuit Time Study (Federal Judicial Center 1974). 
37. Transcript of "A Conversation with Earl Warren,'' in Brandeis /University/ Television 
Recollections, taped May 3, 1972, WGBH, Boston, p. 21, quoted with permission of Dr. Abram 
L. Sachar. 
Justice Hughes' arbitration of the Guatemala-Honduras boundary dispute, although suc-
cessful, led him to counsel against similar assignments to justices because of "the draft upon 
time and energies." THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 167 (D. 
Danelski & J. Tulchin eds. 1973). 
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judicial goals. But what of the benefits - if that is what they were - that 
the arrangement allowed, especially since, if Murphy is to be believed, 
Frankfurter may have influenced some important events in ways in which 
others could not? 
A judge's judicial administration work - in which the judicial perspec-
tive is essential but not sufficient - presents this matter of costs and bene-
fits in sharper contrast. We accept as elementary the normative proposition 
that each judge should dispose of the cases before him or her as fairly, 
quickly, and economically as possible. Such case disposition may not be 
achievable simply if each judge tries hard to do so. The administrative and 
organizational arts - securing resources, devising procedures, promoting 
cooperation, and assessing what works - are necessary to the objective, 
surely, in any large court system, and judges must perform them. The ad-
ministration of justice is a systemic need that may deserve a judge's time at 
the expense of prompt attention to an individual case or set of cases. 
Perhaps the most frequently asserted cost of judges' extra judicial activ-
ity is bias - the inability to do justice because an extrajudicial contact cre-
ates a partiality to one side that affects the judge's decision. What of it 
when judges are asked to decide questions on the bench that bear a rela-
tively distinct relationship to matters that they touched off the bench, per-
haps in a lecture, perhaps in an informal consultation with a government 
official? Brandeis, Murphy shows, participated in cases that presented 
questions he had tried to influence off the bench, but he voted in a manner 
that one would not predict if extrajudicial lobbying foretold judicial behav-
ior. In 1921, "[b]y voting with the Court against the [Lever Food Control] 
act, after having privately told [Food Administrator] Herbert Hoover how 
to get it enacted, Brandeis seemingly demonstrated . . . the separation that 
existed between his judicial and political roles" (p. 55). Another example is 
United States v. But/er,38 which declared the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
unconstitutional. As Murphy says, "[d]espite all his [extrajudicial] admoni-
tions and warnings that he would help dismantle the AAA from the high 
bench, Brandeis, in dissent, voted to uphold the constitutionality of the act" 
(p.142). 
The late Alexander Bickel took up a related aspect of this question dur-
ing Senate Judiciary Committee hearings in the wake of the Fortas affair: 
[A] judge is supposed to have an open mind, or at least a mind reachable 
by reasoned briefs and arguments. If he goes on public record concerning 
issues that are likely to come before him in his judicial capacity, he thereby 
at least appears to close his mind, to make himself less reachable by rea-
soned briefs and arguments. And in some measure every man who goes on 
record in this fashion does in fact close his mind.39 
Here we have some clear questions about how human beings behave. Was 
Bickel right, for example, in the basic message of his hyperbolic assertion 
that "[n]othing is more persuasive to ourselves than our own published 
prose"?40 
Answers to that question have been consistently intuitive, perhaps re-
38. 297 U.S. I (1936). 
39. Nonjudicial Activities Hearings, supra note 24, at 142. 
40. Id.. 
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fleeting larger policy objectives. English judges in the eighteenth century 
justified their practice of giving advisory opinions with the claim that they 
could change their minds "without difficulty"41 if arguments at bar showed 
an earlier advisory opinion to be in error. Vermont Congressman Israel 
Smith told his colleagues in 1802 that "nothing gives [a judge] greater plea-
sure than to have it in his power to correct an error, which he may discover 
in a former opinion."42 Smith, though, was arguing for abolition of the 
separate circuit courts created by the Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801,43 one 
effect of which would be to restore the justices' dual service as circuit 
judges. The justices themselves, however, had never wanted the onerous 
burden of traveling about the circuits. Ten years earlier, in making their 
case, they told Congress that 
appointing the same men finally to correct in one capacity the errors which 
they themselves may have committed in another, is a distinction unfriendly 
to impartial justice, and to that confidence in the Supreme Court which it is 
so essential to the public interest should be reposed in it.44 
Justice Blair put the question when the Court reviewed one of the circuit's 
decisions. He recused himself but announced that he held "the impressions 
which my mind first received," adding parenthetically, however, that he did 
not know if those impressions persisted "whether through the force of truth, 
or from the difficulty of changing opinions, once deliberately formed."45 
It takes nothing from the eloquence of the phrasing - nor the sincerity 
of the writers - to observe that the debate has not come very far in almost 
200 years. Is our knowledge - not suspicion, but knowledge - about the 
factors that may create extrajudical bias much more today than it was in the 
eighteenth century? 
The ways in which extrajudicial activity might warp a judge or justice 
are varied. Impartial decisionmaking might be frustrated by prior contact 
with an issue off the bench, or perhaps by a justice's desire to please those in 
a position to award opportunities for extrajudicial service. In fact, the ma-
jor objection to the first serious instance of a justice's extrajudicial service 
- Jay's serving as ambassador to Great Britain - was not that he would be 
unable to decide cases fairly because of any diplomatic contacts with liti-
gated issues. Rather it was that justices would decide cases as the President 
wished in order to earn prestigious extrajudicial appointments.46 The same 
thought shows itself in Frankfurter's opposition to judges who run for office 
from the bench, namely Douglas. Douglas's votes on cases, Frankfurter 
41. Sackville's Case, 2 Edens Ch. 371-72 (1760). 
42. 7 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 706 (1802). Federalist James Bayard saw it differently: To 
assume a justice would not "be gratified" by an affirmance of an earlier decision "is estimating 
the strength and purity of human nature upon a possible, but not on its ordinary scale." 7 
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 618. 
43. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (1801). 
44. Letter of the Justices to the Congress, Nov. 7, 1792, reprinted in l AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS 52. 
45. Penhallow v. Duane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 54, 109 (1795). 
46. A Jeffersonian paper complained that it was necessary that Jay be in the country were 
he needed to preside over any impeachment proceedings, but also "that he should be above the 
bias which the honor and emoluments in the gift of the executive might create, ... " Aurora 
General Advertiser (Philadelphia), May 10, 1794. 
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feared, were determined by "whether they might help or hurt his chances 
for the presidency." He was " 'writing for a different constituency' " (p. 
267). 
Others might respond that these are meaningless questions, because re-
gardless of whether justices actually become tainted, the citizenry will per-
ceive the judges as biased, and the Court will lose the public support 
essential to acceptance of its decisions. Murphy stresses the importance of 
pubic opinion, but he writes as if the public has the same level of 
knowledge of the justices' work (and of sources such as his book, p. 151) as 
do those who follow the Court closely. He asserts, for an example, that in 
the early twentieth century, "a forgiving public [had] recently acquiesced 
for the first time in over forty years to a close advisory relationship between 
a Supreme Court justice (William Moody) and a president (Theodore 
Roosevelt)" (p. 17). The evidence suggests, though, that the public knows 
little of what the justices do on the bench,47 and it is likely that they know 
less of extrajudicial activities, even when publicly reported. There certainly 
appears to be little basis for Murphy's apparent speculation that, although 
President Nixon's forced resignation had little long-term effect on the pres-
tige of the presidential office, efforts to bar Fortas, Douglas, or Haynsworth, 
from the Court "may permanently lessen public confidence in the Court 
itself, and hence compromise the ability of the entire judicial branch to 
have its decisions accepted as law" (p. 14).48 
Even if John Q. Citizen is unaware of what the justices do - on or off 
the bench - the Court does have a constituency of those who follow public 
events, and, more particularly, various segments of the legal community. 
47. The visibility of the Supreme Court is not easy to measure, but probably it is lower 
than might be inferred from popular opinion polls that appear in the press - based on forced-
choice responses to questions about which people may in fact have no information. Walter 
Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus set about the task of measuring the Court's visibility in the 
1960s, and found that, in 1964 and in 1966, less than half their respondents even attempted to 
answer an open-ended question seeking to learn what "the Supreme Court in Washington has 
done that you have disliked ... liked ... ?" Murphy & Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and 1/1e 
United Stales Supreme Court, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 273, 276-77 (J. Grossman 
& J. Tanenhaus eds. 1969). To a question about the Supreme Court's constitutional role, less 
than 40 percent could give answers that could be coded according to one of ten broad func-
tions -e.g., "interpret the Constitution," or "settle basic questions." Furthermore, this survey 
was conducted in a period of heightened and presumably visible Supreme Court activity. On 
the other hand, as Murphy and Tanenhaus note, open-ended questions may underestimate 
visibility because people have difficulty remembering what they do know. Moreover, visibility 
increased with education. Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra, at 276-86. 
Nevertheless, given these measures of visibility of the Court's basic functions, one can won-
der how visible to the public are a justice's speech, lecture, or visit with the president. 
48. In listing the problems encountered by Fortas, Haynsworth, and Douglas, Murphy also 
cites "the frequent criticism of' Chief Justice Burger, but I am unaware of any serious claim 
that he should not be on the Court and thus do not include him among those about whom such 
claims were made. 
As to Murphy's worries: In 1975 Murphy and Tanenhaus resurveyed those in the original 
study, see note 47 supra, who had displayed some knowledge of the Court. Although their 
object was obviously not to test Bruce Murphy's statement about the effects of questionable 
extrajudicial activity on support for the Court, their conclusion is revealing: "In the aggregate, 
diffuse support [i.e., general trust or confidence) for the Supreme Court, despite tremors that 
shook the entire political system, proved comfortingly resilient." Tanenhaus & Murphy, Pat-
terns of Public Support far the Supreme Court: A Panel Study, 43 J. POL, 24, 29 (1981). 
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That constituency's attitude toward the Court probably influences the 
Court's effectiveness, by setting a climate of trust, or distrust, regarding the 
Court's ability to reach its decisions free from the pressure of improper in-
fluence. A controversial matter off the bench - regardless of whether it 
affects judicial performance - creates an ambiguity, a doubt, that a justice 
can have a partisan position on one issue (in, for example, a speech off the 
bench) but maintain a dispassionate, neutral position on the bench on an-
other issue. This doubt is possible even if the two sets of issues are com-
pletely distinct for the judge, and probable if they are not. . 
Although Brandeis voted to sustain the Agricultural Adjustment Act af-
ter lobbying against it (p. 142), he may have committed a serious error just 
the same, simply by threatening a judicial rebuke to the Act. He failed "to 
observe the most basic stricture for the judiciary, that against using the 
power of judicial office to further political goals" (p. 141). And, as Murphy 
wisely observes, Brandeis' action may have led the officials with whom he 
consulted to believe that they had persuaded a justice how to vote in a case 
(p. 142). What would be the effect, for another example, on trust in the 
Court if it were known that one of its members was lobbying actively for 
the appointment of certain individuals to the bench? There is presumably a 
limit to how much of this kind of ambiguity the Court's constituency will 
tolerate before it begins to discount the authority of the judicial fiat. 
The implications of this speculation, however, tend to becloud what the 
speculation is about, viz., empirical questions. How, in fact, does extrajudi-
cial activity affect judges' work on the bench - their ability to decide cases 
without prejudice - or public confidence in the Court? I do not pretend 
that we have the methodological tools to answer those questions, but I think 
we would elevate the debate if we recognized the kinds of questions they 
are. Murphy's contribution to the debate, however, is significant. He has 
provided much grist for the mill. 
